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ENDING BLIND SPOT JUSTICE:
BROADENING THE TRANSPARENCY
TREND IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
he debate regarding the importance of transparency ver-
sus privacy and confidentiality in international arbitra-
tion1 is at a crossroads. On April 1, 2014, the “ground-breaking”
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion (“Transparency Rules”), promulgated by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), took
effect.2 The title of the Transparency Rules is deliberately ver-
bose and specific—it is intended to provide “prima facie clarity”
that the rules apply to investor-state arbitration, but not inter-
national commercial arbitration.3 Although there is a “blurred
boundary” between these two systems of international arbitra-
tion,4 their basic distinction relates to the identity of the dispu-
tants. That is, international commercial arbitration involves dis-
putes between private “commercial” parties, whereas investor-
state arbitration involves disputes between a private “investor”
1. See generally, Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions Between Confidentiality and
Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 121 (2003).
2. Press release, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Adopts
Transparency Rules for Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration and Amends
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/186 (July 12,
2013) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Adopts Transparency Rules]. The United Na-
tions General Assembly established UNCITRAL in 1966 with a mandate to
“further the progressive harmonization and modernization of the law of inter-
national trade.” UNCITRAL, A Guide to UNCITRAL: Basic Facts about the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 1 (Jan. 2013), avail-
able at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-
UNCITRAL-e.pdf. UNCITRAL pursues its mandate by promoting the use and
adoption, by states and arbitral institutions, of the model legislative and non-
legislative instruments that it drafts. Id.
3. Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 46th Sess., July 8–26, 2013,
U.N. Doc. A/68/17; GAOR, 68th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (July 8$26, 2013).
4. Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbi-
tration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (2006) (noting that precedents and pro-
cedures, as well as lawyers and arbitrators, continuously shuttle between the
two systems of investor-state arbitration and international commercial arbi-
tration).
T
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and a state or state-owned entity.5 The limited scope of the
Transparency Rules leaves international commercial arbitration
in the dark.
The Transparency Rules reverse the presumption of privacy in
investor-state arbitration, while leaving the private nature of in-
ternational commercial arbitration wholly intact.6 International
arbitration is usually private because arbitral hearings, as a
rule, are closed to the public,7 arbitral awards8 are typically not
published, and, when awards are published, their content is of-
ten “sanitized”9 by redaction of party names and other identify-
ing details.10 Thus, commonly, no public record memorializes an
arbitration unless the losing party actively challenges the award
in court or passively refuses to pay damages, and the winning
party consequently goes to court to enforce the award. Such en-
forcement proceedings effectively convert arbitral awards into
civil court judgments and have the tertiary effect of publicly me-
morializing disputes by creating court records.11 But most arbi-
trations end in settlement or voluntary award compliance.12 In
5. Although states, as in nations, and scholars may define the scope of
what is “international” and “commercial” somewhat differently, the fundamen-
tal party-based distinction between the two systems remains accurate. See
RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 7–9 (2000).
6. UNCITRAL Adopts Transparency Rules, supra note 2.
7. The Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
(“ICC”), for instance, state that “[s]ave with the approval of the arbitral tribu-
nal and the parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be ad-
mitted” to hearings. Int’l Chamber of Commerce, ARBITRATION RULES, § 26–3
(2012), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitra-
tion-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/.
8. An arbitral award is the written document that sets forth the “final and
binding” determination of the arbitrator. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF
INT’L COMM. ARB. § 1-1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012).
9. Buys, supra note 1, at 125.
10. See KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 37–38 (2010).
11. See generally, Susan Wiens & Roger Haydock, Confirming Arbitration
Awards: Taking the Mystery out of a Summary Proceeding, 33 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1293, 1294 (2007).
12. According to a recent survey of multinational corporations, 32 percent
of international commercial arbitrations settle. Additionally, 49 percent of ar-
bitrations end in voluntary award compliance, meaning that the losing party
voluntarily pays damages, or otherwise satisfies the award, without challeng-
ing the award in court. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & QUEEN MARY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
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such cases, therefore, the dispute remains private. Under the
Transparency Rules, however, arbitral hearings “shall be public”
by default13 and any document submitted to the arbitral tribunal
by the disputants “shall be made available to the public.”14 Such
features are unprecedented in the transparency trend in inter-
national arbitration.15
The stated purpose of the Transparency Rules, and the trans-
parency trend in general, is to protect public interests.16 The
public interests conceivably at stake in international arbitration
are divisible into four categories: (1) democratic deficit concerns;
(2) public purse and taxpayer concerns; (3) allegations of govern-
ment misconduct; and (4) “profoundly important” public policy
issues.17 The transparency trend is based on the notion that the
general public is a significant stakeholder in international arbi-
tration. Since arbitrations can significantly impact public inter-
ests, people have a right, at least, to notice of disputes that affect
them. For example, when a dispute concerns the “Tanzanian
drinking water supply system,” Tanzanians have a right to know
about the dispute.18 Thus, “improving the rules on public notice”
is among the “specific” goals of organizations that favor the
Transparency Rules.19 Surprisingly, however, the current real-
ity is that “it is often impossible for the public . . . to know . . .
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 2008 10
(2008) [hereinafter CORPORATEATTITUDESSURVEY 2008]; see also Xavier Favre-
Bulle, 50 Years of the New York Convention on Enforcement of Awards, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2008, at 61, 78
(Christoph Muller & Antonio Rigozzi eds., 2008).
13. UNCITRAL Res. 68/109, U.N. Doc. A/68/462, ¶ 6 (Dec. 16, 2013) [here-
after Transparency Rules].
14. Id. ¶ 3.
15. See generally, TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2013) (including various articles
tracing transparency trend developments).
16. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law & Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., REVISING THE
UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES TO ADDRESS INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS 5
(2007), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CIEL_IISD_ Revis-
ingUNCITRAL_Dec07.pdf [hereinafter CIEL Report 2007].
17. Examples of important public policy issues are environmental protec-
tion, public safety and health, and market competition. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 3.
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that an arbitration has been filed . . . [or] what the ultimate [ar-
bitral] decision is.”20 Although disputants could theoretically
agree to notify regulators or the media about an arbitration that
impacts public interests, such voluntary public notice “rarely
happen[s]” because at least one party normally desires to stay
out of the figurative “sunshine” and avoid “public scrutiny.”21
Proponents of the transparency trend in international arbitra-
tion recognize that a system in which parties resolve arbitra-
tions that impact important public interests, without public no-
tice, paints a grotesque portrait.22 Thus, it is “now widely recog-
nized” that remedial steps like the adoption of the Transparency
Rules are necessary to protect public interests by increasing
transparency in international arbitration—at least in the sys-
tem of investor-state arbitration.23
The rationale for narrowing the scope of the Transparency
Rules, and the transparency trend in general, thus far, to inves-
tor-state arbitration is that a “public interest difference” exists
between investor-state arbitration and international commer-
cial arbitration.24 Arguably, the first three categories of public
interests—democratic deficit concerns, public purse concerns,
20. Id. at 5. The Transparency Rules will take time to significantly alter the
treaty-based, investor-state arbitration landscape because, by default, the
rules only apply to new treaties. Many bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”),
however, already exist. See Transparency Rules, supra note 13, ¶ 3.1. Although
parties to a BIT may mutually agree to apply the Transparency Rules retroac-
tively, states have not signaled that such revisions are expected. BITs are in-
tended to encourage and protect foreign direct investments; they generally in-
clude an arbitration regime that enables foreign investors to compel arbitra-
tion if a state or state-owned entity breaches its contractual obligations, or vice
versa. Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFF. OF THEU.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last vis-
ited Jan. 13, 2014).
21. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3–4; see also Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Third-Party Participation
(NGO’s and Private Persons) and Transparency in ICSID Proceedings, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
(ICSID): TAKINGSTOCKAFTER 40YEARS 179, 180 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian
J. Tams eds., 2007); Julie Lee, Note, UNCITRAL’s Unclear Transparency In-
strument: Fashioning the Form and Application of A Legal Standard Ensuring
Greater Disclosure in Investor-State Arbitrations, 33 NW. J. INT’LL.&BUS. 439,
446 (2013).
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and allegations of government misconduct—are not directly im-
plicated in disputes between private parties, and issues of public
policy are not necessarily at stake in commercial disputes. In
light of this difference, some scholars and institutions conclude
that a lack of transparency is tolerable in international commer-
cial arbitration, even though commercial disputes may impact
profoundly important public policy issues.
This Note challenges the legitimacy and sufficiency of the
“public interest difference” as a rationale to conclude that
greater transparency is not required in international commer-
cial arbitration. It also explores how the United States Supreme
Court mistakenly opened the floodgates, allowing parties to use
international commercial arbitration to privately resolve com-
mercial disputes that affect public interests, in its watershed
Mitsubishi Motors decision.25 The holding of the Court greatly
expanded subject matter arbitrability: post-Mitsubishi, even
statutory claims that impact profoundly important issues of pub-
lic policy, such as Sherman Act antitrust claims, are arbitrable.26
Although collusion may not poison public water supplies, it does
pick the public’s pocket.27 The Supreme Court based its holding
on the misguided presumption that the “award-enforcement
stage”28 would give courts the chance to minimally review the
findings of tribunals29 and ensure that tribunals “took cogni-
zance [of] . . . and actually decided” claims sensitive to public
policy.30 Furthermore, the Court presumed that enforcement
25. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
26. Id.
27. In a recently settled FBI and DOJ investigation of a vast price-fixing
scheme involving a number of Japanese automotive part suppliers, a scheme
at least a decade old, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation faces a fine of US$190
million. Additionally, automotive parts worth over US$5 billion and over 25
million cars sold in the United States alone were affected. According to an as-
sistant director at the FBI, “[t]he scheme directly impacted your bank account.”
Erick Ayapana, 21 Parts Suppliers Busted in Price-Fixing Scandal, MOTOR
TREND, January 2014, at 20.
28. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
29. The “tribunal” in arbitration is comparable to the “court” in litigation.
See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
30. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
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proceedings would also serve the “policing function” of the Sher-
man Act by bringing the dispute to the attention of the general
public and government authorities.31 But hindsight reveals that
enforcement proceedings frequently do not occur because most
arbitrations end in settlement or voluntary award compliance.32
In such instances, public notice therefore never occurs. Thus, the
current system of international commercial arbitration permits
disputes that impact profoundly important public policy inter-
ests to be resolved outside of the public’s view. Such blind spot
justice must end.
Part I of this Note defines “privacy,” “confidentiality,” and
“transparency” in the context of international arbitration. It also
discusses how arbitral awards are readily enforced in the courts
of most states under the widely acceded to Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New
York Convention”).33 Additionally, Part I traces the history of
the transparency trend in international arbitration from its
North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) related ori-
gins to the adoption of the Transparency Rules. Part II chal-
lenges the “public interest difference” rationale for confining the
transparency trend to the system of investor-state arbitration.
Part III analyzes Mitsubishi Motors to epitomize the concept of
blind spot justice, illustrating how international commercial ar-
bitration imperils public interests. Part IV concludes by urging
UNCITRAL, especially due to its connection to human rights
and public interests as a subdivision of the United Nations, to
adopt a rule applicable to international commercial arbitration
that requires the publication of unsanitized arbitral awards, in
an effort to protect public interests and promote the integrity of
international commercial arbitration.34
31. Id. at 635.
32. FAVRE-BULLE, supra note 12, at 78.
33. FAVRE-BULLE, supra note 12, at 61–62.
34. On new grounds, this Note revives scholarly calls for the publication of
arbitral awards in international commercial arbitration. Prior scholarship is
largely unconcerned with protecting public interests, but instead encompasses
publishing awards for the following purposes: (1) to encourage the development
of a “collective arbitral wisdom” akin to a consistent body of common law based
on precedent, see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unity Theory
of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
949, 1085 (2000); (2) to help parties select suitable arbitrators, id. at 1056–59;
(3) to help parties avoid future disputes, Buys, supra note 1, at 136–38; (4) to
better promote awards as fair, which will make “implementation” of awards
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I. BACKGROUND
To understand blind spot justice, it is necessary to clearly de-
fine the terms of the international arbitration transparency de-
bate, understand how the New York Convention has enabled in-
ternational commercial arbitration to flourish, and appreciate
the history of the transparency trend in international arbitra-
tion.
A. Defining Key Terms
1. Privacy
In the context of international arbitration, the term “privacy”
is used to describe the aspects of a dispute that are unknown or
inaccessible to the public.35 Therefore, an arbitral dispute that
is resolved from start to finish without any public notice of its
occurrence may be characterized as occurring in absolute pri-
vacy. International commercial arbitration, which consists of
disputes between private36 parties, involves a high degree of pri-
vacy because arbitral hearings are customarily closed to the pub-
lic. Additionally, arbitral awards are typically not published,
and, in the limited instances where awards are published, their
content is often “sanitized”37 by redaction of party names and
other identifying details.38 Thus, commonly, no public record me-
morializes an arbitral dispute unless the losing party either ac-
tively challenges the award by seeking a court order of vacatur39
or passively fails to comply with the award. An additional re-
quirement in the latter scenario is that the winning party must
easier, id.; (5) to “promote[] democratic principles,” which is a quasi-extension
of the democratic deficit principle, id.; and (6) to give practitioners and aca-
demics the chance to analyze, critique, and improve the dispute resolution sys-
tem. Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confi-
dentiality Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 969, 1018 (2001).
35. See, e.g., Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in Inter-
national Arbitration: The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 923, 958 (2003).
36. Here, note a distinct second usage of “private,” meaning “[r]elating or
belonging to an individual, as opposed to the . . . government.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 595 (4th ed. 2011).
37. Buys, supra note 1, at 125.
38. See NOUSSIA, supra note 10, at 38.
39. See generally, Restatement (Third) U.S. Law of Int’l Comm. Arb. § 1-1
TD No 2 (2012).
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go to court and commence an enforcement proceeding, which ef-
fectively converts the arbitral award into a civil court judg-
ment.40 But most arbitrations end in settlement or voluntary
award compliance and thus remain private.41 According to a
2008 survey of major multinational corporations that utilize the
system of international commercial arbitration, enforcement
proceedings are required in only 11 percent of disputes; another
8 percent of disputes involve a supposed settlement or award,
but are followed by litigation.42 In international commercial ar-
bitration, therefore, only 19 percent of disputes are estimated to
result in the production of a public court record;43 the remaining
81 percent enjoy absolute privacy.44 Although similar statistics
for investor-state arbitration are not available, when organiza-
tions note that “it is often impossible for the public or other states
to know . . . that an arbitration has been filed . . . [or] what the
ultimate [arbitral] decision is,” they are implicitly referring to
investor-state arbitration.45 Thus, investor-state arbitration also
involves a high degree of privacy. The privacy aspects of arbitra-
tion, including the closed-door nature of hearings and the lack of
public records and public notice of disputes, however, must not
be confused with “confidentiality.”46
2. Confidentiality
Confidentiality in the context of international arbitration
“goes further than privacy”47 because it places secrecy re-
strictions on the players involved in the arbitration.48 While the
40. Wiens & Haydock, supra note 11, at 1294.
41. FAVRE-BULLE, supra note 12, at 78.
42. The survey found that international commercial arbitration outcomes
parse out as follows: 32 percent of disputes settle; 49 percent of disputes end
in voluntary award compliance; 11 percent of cases result in enforcement pro-
ceedings; and the remaining 8 percent of disputes involve litigation subsequent
to a settlement or arbitral award. See CORPORATE ATTITUDES 2008, supra note
12, at 2, 10.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 5.
46. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2006).
47. NOUSSIA, supra note 10, at 40.
48. In addition to the disputing parties, the cast of “players” who may be
affected by confidentiality restrictions include the arbitral tribunal, meaning
the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, arbitral institutions, and sometimes even
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issue of defining “confidentiality” and “privacy” in the context of
international arbitration has spurred much scholarly debate and
even confusion among practitioners,49 an instructive way to dis-
tinguish the two terms is to focus on whom is restricted. “Pri-
vacy” considerations restrict the general public’s access to arbi-
tral hearings and documents.50 By contrast, “confidentiality”
considerations restrict what the disputants, the tribunal, and
the arbitral institution may disclose to others.51 Conveniently,
based upon common figures of speech, such a distinction is intu-
itive because speaking “in private” means no one else is around,
while being told something “in confidence”means that the recip-
ient of the information is expected to keep it secret.52 Under the
rules of arbitral institutions, such as the ICC, international ar-
bitration is private by default, but not confidential. Although the
tribunal and the institution are generally bound to keep the ex-
istence of a dispute and information related to it confidential,
the disputants are not similarly restricted.53
courts—where enforcement proceedings or other arbitration related litigation,
such as a request for interim relief, occur. Compare NOUSSIA, supra note 10, at
165–66 (discussing that courts in some jurisdictions, including France, Ger-
many, and England, may hold they are bound by an implied duty of confiden-
tiality), with ALI YESILIRMAK, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 52 (2005) (“provisional relief decisions [by courts]
will generally not be confidential.”). Witnesses who testify during arbitral
hearings are a notable exception from the cast of “players” and are normatively
not bound by confidentiality restrictions. NOUSSIA, supra note 10, at 165–66.
49. See Schmitz, supra note 46, at 1212.
50. Id. at 1211 (“arbitration is private in that it is a closed process” and it
does not “produce public opinions that courts infuse into public law.”).
51. Id.; NOUSSIA, supra note 10, at 37–41; see also BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY
146 (4th ed. 2011) (“confidentiality” means “the state of having the dissemina-
tion of certain information restricted”).
52. Moreover, the dictionary definition of a “confidentiality agreement” is “a
promise not to disclose . . . information learned in the course of the parties’
relationship.” BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY 146 (4th ed. 2011).
53. For example, under the ICC Arbitration rules, the work of the Interna-
tional Court of Arbitration (“ICA”) is expressly confidential. See Arbitration
Rules, supra note 7, Appendix 1, Article 6, at 44. Moreover, even if a third party
learned about an arbitration and sought further information, copies of an ar-
bitral award, under the ICC rules, “shall be made available upon request and
at any time to the parties, but to no one else.” Id. The ICA was founded in 1923
as the arbitration body of the ICC. Arbitration, ICC, iccwbo.org/products-and-
services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). Its name
is a misnomer, however, as it is a supervisory organization, and not an actual
tribunal that conducts hearings. The ICA appoints arbitrators, monitors the
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Yet arbitration is a “creature of contract.”54 During contract
negotiations, the parties may easily modify a standard arbitra-
tion clause to effectively include a confidentiality agreement
that requires them to keep even the existence of future arbitral
disputes secret.55 Despite the transparency trend, in a recent re-
port on investor-state arbitration, the ICC explains how to draft
a modified arbitration clause that “protects confidentiality.”56
When such a clause is inserted in a contract, any future dispute
arising out of or related to the contract will be highly confiden-
tial: the tribunal, the arbitral institution, and the disputantswill
be bound to keep the arbitration secret, unless required by ap-
plicable law to disclose certain information.57
Thus, even though the default structure of international arbi-
tration does not place secrecy restrictions upon the disputants,
confidentiality, due to the ease of its full implementation, is still
arbitral process, and “approves” arbitral awards. Although the approval pro-
cess, at first glance, seems akin to a form of appellate review, it is not; the ICA
merely checks that the tribunal addressed all pertinent issues in a dispute and
that the award is adequately written. Id.
54. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that a court must always inquire whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate, because arbitration is a “creature of contract”).
55. ICC Commission, ICC Arbitration Commission Report on Arbitration In-
volving States and State Entities under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, 3, Doc.
862, (Mar. 17, 2014) [hereinafter ICC State Report], available at http://www.ic-
cwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2012/ICC-Arbitration-
Commission-Report-on-Arbitration-Involving-States-and-State-Entities-un-
der-the-ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/.
56. Id. The model modified ICC confidential arbitration clause reads as fol-
lows:
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract
shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in
accordance with the said Rules. The parties agree to keep confidential
the existence of the arbitration, the arbitral proceedings, the submis-
sions made by the parties and the decisions made by the arbitral tri-
bunal, including its awards, except as required by applicable law and
to the extent not already in the public domain.
Id. (italics added in lieu of bolded text in original).
57. For example, limited regulatory reporting requirements may exist. See
discussion infra Part III.C.
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considered a major advantage of arbitration, compared to litiga-
tion.58 The confidential nature of arbitration makes it ideal for
protecting trade secrets, which may be more prone to infor-
mation leaks during litigation.59 Yet, the efficacy of confidential-
ity in arbitration extends beyond protecting intellectual prop-
erty. Confidentiality may silence all of the arbitral players and,
as a result, the negative press that often surrounds litigation
may be avoided.60 Thus, a modified arbitration clause that in-
cludes a confidentiality provision may function as an effective
reputational risk mitigation tool. This helps explain why multi-
national corporations in industries prone to negative publicity
and closely monitored by special interest groups, such as the en-
ergy sector, report that to them “confidentiality” is an especially
important characteristic of international arbitration.61
58. See, e.g. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 14; Buys, supra note 1, at 121;
PriceWaterhouseCoopers & Queen Mary University of London School of Inter-
national Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE CHOICES IN
INTERNATIONALARBITRATION 8 (2013) [hereinafter CORPORATECHOICES] (show-
ing confidentiality ranked in the top two perceived benefits of arbitration for
36 percent of survey respondents).
59. See Gu Weixia, Confidentiality Revisited: Blessing or Curse in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration?, 15 AM. REV. INT’LARB. 607, 630 (2004).
60. Confidentiality is important to parties that “would prefer to keep their
disputes private, thereby avoiding publicity that may hurt their image or ben-
efit their competitors. The confidentiality of arbitral proceedings enables par-
ties to resolve their disputes in private, without media attention, and ensure
that the substance of the proceedings will not be disclosed.” See Brown, supra
note 34, at 972 n.8 (quoting Philip Rothman, Pssst, Please Keep It Confidential:
Arbitration Makes It Possible, 49-SEP DISP. RESOL. J. 69 (1994).
61. See CORPORATE CHOICES, supra note 58, at 8 (discussing survey that
found energy industry respondents to value confidentiality highly among the
benefits of international arbitration, compared to other industries, such as con-
struction); See also Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft
Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 465–66
(2004). Focusing on the energy sector, Williams discusses how international oil
conglomerates have embraced corporate social responsibility as a way to man-
age the “globalization backlash” and calls for them to act more responsibly,
given the global impact of their actions and their heightened visibility in the
media. See Id. Williams explains that a tactic of energy producers is to “work
with” nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), rather than let them dictate
the conversation and calls for regulatory reform. See Id. Modern NGOs, often
focused on environmental or human rights concerns, are “extremely well
versed at harnessing the power of publicity.” Id. at 466.
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3. Transparency
Ironically, “transparency” is not always clearly defined in the
context of international arbitration.62 Scholarly debate and con-
fusion surrounding the issue has led to a variety of definitions,
spurred warnings to “listen carefully” when scholars define
“transparency,” and even prompted an allegorical symposium
speech.63 In the speech, the task of defining “transparency” is
compared to the parable of blind persons who encounter an ele-
phant and attempt to identify what they have found after each
person touches only one part of the animal—a leg is mistaken
for a tree, the stringy tail is mistaken for rope, and the watery
trunk is mistaken for a hose.64 The pertinent lesson is that nar-
row definitions of “transparency” consider only one part of the
term’s full meaning—if the other parts are regarded as inde-
pendent, then sooner or later one is liable to be stepped on by an
elephant.65
Some scholars, nonetheless, parse out what most consider to
be parts of “transparency” into three “distinct but related con-
cepts:” (1) public access; (2) public disclosure; and (3) transpar-
ency.66 The third “transparency” concept, however, is narrowly
defined to refer only to “the ready availability to ‘interested par-
ties’ of the rules that regulate” the adjudicatory process, a
largely procedural concern.67 Thus, “transparency” becomes
merely about whether the “interested” disputants are informed
of what procedures and rules govern the tribunal’s conduct. Such
a narrow conception of the term is best described as “procedural
transparency” because it does nothing to notify the public about
the substance of disputes. By narrowing the definition of “trans-
parency,” these scholars reach the distorted conclusion that a
“surprisingly high level of transparency” already exists in inter-
national commercial arbitration.68 Under the narrow definition,
admittedly, procedural aspects of arbitration have become
highly transparent due to the rise in popularity of institutional
62. Rogers, supra note 4, at 1303.
63. See John R. Crook, Joint Study Panel on Transparency in International
Commercial Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT’L&COMP. L. 361, 363 (2009).
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Rogers, supra note 4, at 1303.
67. Id. at 1303.
68. Id.
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arbitration,69 which uses flexible, but officially codified, proce-
dures that are readily available in rulebooks.70
But current usage of the term “transparency” by the ICC, the
conten of the Transparency Rules, and scholarly discussions of
the public interest rationale for increasing transparency in in-
vestor-state arbitration all indicate that the term is prudently
defined in a broad manner that includes the trifecta of public
access, public disclosure, and procedural transparency.71
The 2012 ICC report on investor-state arbitration uses “trans-
parency” to refer to procedural transparency72 and the public
disclosure of arbitral awards;73 consequently, the ICC rejects the
narrow definition of “transparency.”74 Furthermore,
69. Institutional arbitration is defined in contrast to “ad hoc” arbitration.
The former applies rules set by an arbitral institution and is supervised by the
institution to a limited extent. For example, the institution sometimes plays a
role in appointing the arbitrators and, under ICC rules, a central body sum-
marily approves awards. Ad hoc arbitration, by contrast, may still apply the
rules of an institution, but the proceedings occur outside the supervision of an
arbitral institution. Arbitration, ICC, http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-ser-
vices/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
70. The arbitration rules of major international arbitral institutions, such
as the ICC, the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), are
readily available online to interested parties and the public alike. See ICC
Rules of Arbitration, supra note 7; LCIA Arbitration Rules, LCIA, available at
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-
2014.aspx; See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID Rules
of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, available at https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
71. See ICC State Report, supra note 55, at 3–4; Transparency Rules, supra
note 13, ¶ 3; CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16.
72. Id. at 4. (“States seeking transparency in [investor-state] arbitration
may wish the court to communicate the reasons for its decision” and thus may
include a clause in their agreement that says so). Although this usage of “trans-
parency” initially seems substantive, it is really about arranging a transparent
procedural mechanism. The decision referred to is a discretionary procedural
decision made by the ICA, the central supervisory body of the ICC, to reject
the appointment of a party-selected arbitrator.
73. ICC State Report, supra note 55, at 3. (explaining that states and their
private contractual counterparties, while negotiating an arbitration clause,
“can agree on greater transparency . . . by providing for the award . . . to be
made public.”).
74. A counterargument exists, claiming that the ICC does not reject the nar-
row meaning, but rather it uses “transparency” in two distinct but related
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UNCITRAL’s Transparency Rules overwhelmingly support a
broad definition of “transparency” because its two pivotal provi-
sions, making arbitral hearings public and requiring that arbi-
tral documents be published, respectively relate to public access
and public disclosure.75 Additionally, the widely accepted public
interest rationale for increasing transparency in investor-state
arbitration is about shedding light on the state actors involved,
not the procedures and actions of the tribunal.76 Thus, the trans-
parency trend in international arbitration is primarily about in-
creasing public access to arbitral hearings and increasing public
disclosure of arbitral awards and other documents;77 secondar-
ily, the trend is about ensuring that the procedures governing
the arbitration are known to the parties. It is therefore time to
step away from narrow definitions of the past78—away from the
elephant’s foot—and move forward to fully endorse broad defini-
tions of “transparency,” which reflect current realities.79
ways. See Buys, supra note 1, at 133. Nevertheless, by using the term “trans-
parency” in both instances, the ICC rejects the notion that “transparency” is
only about procedural matters.
75. Transparency Rules, supra note 13, ¶ 6 (public hearings), ¶ 3 (docu-
ments “shall be made public”).
76. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 4.
77. See ICC State Report, supra note 55, at 3–4; see also Transparency
Rules, supra note 13.
78. See also Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative
Bodies, 41 GEO.WASH. INT’LL. REV. 107, 153 (2009) (arguing that transparency
means that the “interested parties, both inside and outside the judicial process,
can observe its processes and outcomes”).
79. See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State
Disputes – Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
1339, 1339 (2006) (“transparency” means the “extent to which the public may
be alerted to, gain information about, and perhaps participate in, proceedings
organized to adjudicate”); see also Florentine P. Feliciano, The Ordre Public
Dimensions of Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration,
in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 16, 19 (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2013) (“transparency” in interna-
tional arbitration “generally takes the form of disclosure to third parties”); Jef-
frey T. Cook, The Evolution of Investment-State Dispute Resolution in NAFTA
and CAFTA: Wild West to World Order, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 1085, 1100 (2006)
(“transparency” means “the full and timely disclosure of information”).
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B. The New York Convention, Award Enforcement, and Finality
1. Enforcement
Besides its privacy and confidentiality features, the funda-
mental advantage of international arbitration compared to liti-
gation is the easy enforceability of arbitral awards under the
New York Convention.80Although courts historically had a “pa-
rochial” view of arbitration and therefore regularly refused to
compel arbitration, and often refused to enforce awards when
they were challenged in court, the convention marked a para-
digm shift.81 This shift ushered in the modern era of arbitration,
in which nations, including the United States, have adopted
laws and policies that expressly favor the enforceability of arbi-
tral awards under the convention.82 Thanks to the New York
Convention, foreign arbitral awards are now broadly enforceable
80. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–14. In addition to enforceability and
finality, which this Note will specifically address, other advantages of arbitra-
tion include the ability to select arbitrators, neutrality, speed, choice of lan-
guage, and costs. Id. See also, CORPORATECHOICES, supra note 58, at 8 (listing
such benefits of international arbitration as the ability to appoint experts as
arbitrators, neutrality, confidentiality, enforceability, flexibility of procedure,
speed, and cost). “Privacy” is notably absent from such lists because it is in-
cluded in the discussion of confidentiality in many sources, contributing to the
confusion between the two terms. See generally, Schmitz, supra note 46; see
also Brown, supra note 34, at 972–75 (“confidentiality is impossible without
privacy and privacy is meaningless without confidentiality.”). The notable dis-
advantages of arbitration include the “lack of coercive power,” such as the ina-
bility to adequately compel discovery if needed, and unsuitability for multi-
party claims. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 15. Because only parties bound
by an arbitration clause may generally be compelled to arbitrate, compared to
litigation, it is more difficult to consolidate multiparty claims under arbitration
joinder rules. Id. Yet, a nonsignatory party may be bound to arbitrate just as
a nonsignatory may be held liable under traditional principals of contract law,
such as estoppel and assumption. See Thomson–CSF, S.A. v. American Arbi-
tration Association, 64 F.3d 773, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1995).
81. See generally, Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building
the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343, 1365-68 (2009).
82. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corpo-
ration, 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act is a “con-
gressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments” and that since the 1960s courts of appeals have addressed “questions
of arbitrability . . . with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbi-
tration. We agree.”).
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around the world.83 The convention is of “paramount im-
portance” for international commercial arbitration and is one of
the most widely ratified treaties.84 Although enforcement in the
minority of states that have not acceded to the convention, which
are mostly new and developing nations, remains an obstacle,85
to date there are 149 member nations.86 After accession, member
states implement the New York Convention by adopting domes-
tic legislation to codify its principles.87
The New York Convention has a “pro-enforcement bias.”88 Un-
der Article V of the convention, consequently, there are limited
exclusive defenses against the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards.89 Once enforcement proceedings are com-
83. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 101.
84. FAVRE-BULLE, supra note 12, at 61–62.
85. Id. at 77.
86. UNCITRAL provides a current list of member states, notable reserva-
tions, and a chronology of events regarding changes in the status of the con-
vention. See Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un-
citral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited October 30,
2014).
87. Shearman & Sterling and Columbia Law School, in cooperation with
UNCITRAL, operate a user-friendly website designed to track developments
in the evolution of case law involving the New York Convention. The website
also includes links to the codifying legislation of many states. See NEW YORK
CONVENTIONGUIDE, http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org.
88. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale de l’Indus-
trie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974).
89. The limited defenses focus primarily on procedural fairness. Article V(1)
permits courts to refuse to enforce an award on the following grounds: (a) show-
ing incapacity of a party; (b) showing a lack of proper notice, or showing that a
party was “otherwise unable to present [its] case”; (c) showing the award goes
“beyond the scope” of the agreement to arbitrate; (d) showing the “composition”
of the tribunal or the “arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agree-
ment of the parties”; (e) showing the award is not yet binding or “has been set
aside,”meaning vacated, “by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made.” Practically, (e) means that only
the courts of the country that is the place of arbitration may generally set aside
the award. Article V(2) is more substantive, but limited, and narrowly con-
strued, see infra Part III, and permits courts to refuse to enforce an award on
the following grounds: (a) showing the subject matter of the dispute is nonar-
bitrable under the law of the country where enforcement is sought; and (b)
showing “enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy” of
the country where enforcement is sought. New York Convention, art V, June
10, 1958, 339 U.N.T.S. 38.
2014] ARBITRAL TRANSPARENCY 223
menced in court, the burden is on the party challenging enforce-
ment of the award to use the Article V defenses to basically prove
that the arbitration was procedurally unfair. One Article V de-
fense is a showing that the “subject matter of the [dispute] . . . is
not capable of settlement by arbitration” under the law of the
country where enforcement of the award is sought.90 But, in light
of theMitsubishi Motors decision, which broadened subject mat-
ter arbitrability,91 such a defense is practically unusable. Simply
put, later courts, both domestically and abroad, cite Mitsubishi
Motors in support of the principle that, absent legislation to the
contrary,92 any subject matter is arbitrable. Article V is the ex-
clusive source of defenses against the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards.93 Even if the party challenging
enforcement of the award proves that the tribunal erroneously
applied the law, such proof is not grounds for non-enforcement
because legal error is not an Article V defense.94 The pro-enforce-
ment bias of the New York Convention and its limited Article V
defenses militate against challenging awards in court, which
helps explain why voluntary award compliance is so common.95
The objective of the New York Convention was to make arbi-
tral awards “truly mobile and universal.”96 After over fifty years
in force and considering the enforceability of awards around the
world, scholars find it a resounding success.97 In litigation, a
court judgment from one country may not be recognized by the
courts of another country, specifically the country in which the
90. New York Convention, supra note 89, art. V(2)(a).
91. See infra Part III.
92. An example of legislation to the contrary is a 1993 directive by the Coun-
cil of the European Union, entitled “Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.”
Some EU member states have interpreted the directive as proscribing manda-
tory consumer arbitration, which effectively makes consumer disputes nonar-
bitrable. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on A
Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employ-
ment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831
(2002).
93. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 102-03.
94. See id. at 117–18.
95. See FAVRE-BULLE, supra note 12.
96. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 102.
97. FAVRE-BULLE, supra note 12, at 61.
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assets of the losing party are located.98 Such an occurrence de-
nies the winning party effective means to collect damages. Un-
der the New York Convention, however, an arbitral award ren-
dered in one member state “shall” be enforced by the courts of
all other member states, unless a limited Article V defense ap-
plies.99 Such easy enforceability of awards around the world pro-
motes international commerce because parties may enter inter-
national contracts that contain an arbitration clause without
worrying about how or where they will be able to collect damages
if a dispute arises.100
2. Finality
In addition to the privacy and confidentiality aspects of inter-
national arbitration and the easy enforceability of arbitral
awards under the New York Convention, international arbitra-
tion has become the most widely used mechanism for the resolu-
tion of international commercial disputes, due to the final and
binding nature of arbitration.101 All modern arbitration laws fol-
low the fundamental principle that the substantive decisions of
the arbitral tribunal are not subject to appeal.102 The “very in-
tention” of submitting to arbitration is that the dispute be finally
decided by the tribunal.103 Under the New York Convention,
even a clear misapplication of law is not sufficient grounds for a
98. Still, if certain parameters are met, courts will recognize foreign judg-
ments. In such proceedings, the party challenging enforcement of the foreign
court judgment is not constrained by the Article V defenses of the New York
Convention; thus, international arbitration remains a more enforceable dis-
pute resolution mechanism than international litigation because defenses are
severely limited in arbitration. See Sung Hwan Co., LTD. v. Rite Aid Corp.,
850 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 2006) (finding a Korean court judgment against a U.S.
corporation enforceable because the foreign court’s exercise of jurisdiction com-
ports with “New York’s concept of personal jurisdiction” under New York’s
long-arm statute).
99. See New York Convention, supra note 89, art. III (member states “shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them”); New York Conven-
tion, Article V(1) (enforcement of the award may be refused “only if” the party
challenging enforcement furnishes proof that satisfies an Article V defense).
100. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 101–03.
101. Arbitration, ICC, iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-
adr/arbitration/ (Sept. 6, 2013, 3:35 PM).
102. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its
Enforcement, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 123, 129 (2008).
103. Id.
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refusal to enforce an arbitral award.104 Although parties chal-
lenging the enforcement of an award often rely on the public pol-
icy defense found in Article V(2)(b) of the convention, such argu-
ments are generally futile; courts construe the public policy de-
fense narrowly because it is intended to protect only the “spe-
cific, sacrosanct taboos and interests” of a state.105
Furthermore, international arbitration is final because arbi-
tral awards are binding.106 Unlike systems of amicable dispute
resolution,107 such as mediation, wherein the parties may or may
not agree to follow the recommendations of a mediator, arbitra-
tion results in a binding award; by submitting to arbitration, the
parties “agree to agree” to be bound by the decision of the arbi-
tral tribunal. Once the tribunal issues its decision in an arbitral
award, the award is easily enforceable around the world under
the New York Convention.
C. History of the Transparency Trend
The transparency trend in international arbitration derives
from the system of investor-state arbitration and thus far is
104. Id.
105. Id. at 132. While losing parties often try to use the public policy excep-
tion as a last resort “catchall” defense in enforcement proceedings, such efforts
are largely futile. The public policy exception is narrowly interpreted to require
a finding that enforcement is against not only the public policy of the adjudi-
cating state, but also against international public policy. For example, even if
enforcement would violate the antitrust laws of the adjudicating state, the
competitive market principles behind such laws are not universally accepted.
Thus, an antitrust violation might not be sufficient to trigger the public policy
exception. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 109–10. An example of enforcement
violating international public policy is an arbitral award that is demonstrably
tainted by fraud or corruption. Id. Even so, courts have set a high bar for meet-
ing the exception on the basis of fraud. The fraud must be established by clear
evidence, it must have been non-discoverable by the exercise of due diligence
during the arbitration, and it must be materially related to an issue in the
arbitration. Bonar v. DeanWitter Reynolds Inc. 835 F.2d. 1378, 1383 (11th Cir.
1988).
106. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–14.
107. “Amicable” dispute resolution systems include mediation, negotiation,
and nonbinding arbitration. Nonbinding arbitration is occasionally used by
parties to preview the likely outcome of their dispute in contemplated binding
arbitration or litigation. J. M. Townsend, Promoting Peace Before Conflict: In-
tegrating Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution into the Arbitration Pro-
cess, in ARBITRATION ADVOCACY IN CHANGING TIMES 35, 35 (2012).
226 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:1
mainly limited to such system.108 This Note, however, calls for a
broadening of the trend and its public interest motives to the
system of international commercial arbitration. The trend to in-
crease transparency dates back to at least July 31, 2001, when
the Free Trade Commission (“FTC”) of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)109 issued an interpretation of
NAFTA’s arbitration regime that aimed to protect public inter-
ests. The FTC’s 2001 interpretation stated that the public should
have “nearly unfettered access” to documents created during dis-
putes conducted under the regime.110 Since the text of NAFTA
was silent on issues of confidentiality, the interpretation relied
on such omission to argue that documents may be publicly dis-
closed.111 But the practical effects of the FTC’s 2001 interpreta-
tion were limited. Arbitral disputes conducted pursuant to
NAFTA’s arbitration regime were still subject to the rules of the
arbitral institution selected by the parties, many of which were
much more restrictive than the FTC’s interpretation.112 In most
investor-state contracts, parties select the arbitration rules of
UNCITRAL or the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (“ICSID”),113 both of which contain provisions
that keep arbitral documents private and confidential at the
time.114 Therefore, the early efforts of the FTC’s 2001 interpre-
tation to increase transparency brought about little change. It
did, however, plant the seed for the transparency trend.115
Five years later, ICSID resolved to support greater transpar-
ency in investor-state arbitration through amendments to its
2006 Arbitration Rules—the revised rules grant the tribunal dis-
cretionary power to permit public access to hearings, unless ei-
ther party to the dispute objects.116 The rules also establish that
“excerpts of the legal reasoning of the tribunal” shall be
108. See generally,Nakagawa, supra note 15 (including various articles trac-
ing transparency trend developments).
109. NAFTA’s FTC is comprised of trade ministers from each of the three
member governments. The commission has the authority to interpret NAFTA.
Lee, supra note 24, at 450.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 453.
112. Id. at 452.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 450$53.
115. Id. at 458.
116. Id. at 454–56.
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promptly published by the courts.117 The arbitral award, how-
ever, may not be published without unanimous party consent.118
Although these revisions are admirable attempts to increase
transparency, the ability of a party to unilaterally proscribe pub-
lication of the award limits the practical impact of such
measures.119 Still, in the past four years, ICSID has jumped
ahead of the normative transparency trend curve on a few occa-
sions by webcasting, in real time, certain arbitration proceedings
that have involved highly palpable public interest implica-
tions.120 ICSID’s revised rules helped set the stage for
UNCITRAL’s adoption of the Transparency Rules.
Most recently, UNCITRAL advanced the transparency trend
by incorporating the Transparency Rules into the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules 2013;121 yet not all arbitral institutions have
fully endorsed the trend. The ICC revised its arbitration rules in
2012, but the revisions did not advance, or set back, the trans-
parency trend. Instead, the ICC issued a report on investor-state
arbitration, concomitant to the ICC Arbitration Rules 2012, that
includes advice on how to achieve more or less transparency.122
The report notes that states and their private counterparties
117. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], ICSID Convention,
Regulations and Rules, rule 48(4), at 122, ICSID Doc. ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006),
available at https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf [herein-
after ICSID Rules].
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See Sofia Plagakis, Webcasting: A Tool to Increase Transparency in Ju-
dicial proceedings, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONALTRADE AND INVESTMENT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 84, 84 (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2013). The first case to be
webcast by ICSID involved a dispute on stopping harmful metal mining in El
Salvador. The holding in Pac Rim Cayman LLC. v. Republic of El Salvador
gave the public greater access to information that affected public health and
the environment. Id. at 84.
121. Unless states agree otherwise, the Transparency Rules only apply to
new BITs by default; they do not apply retroactively to BITs enacted prior to
the effective date of the Transparency Rules—even where the terms of a BIT
contemplate “dynamic” periodic amendments to UNCITRAL’s arbitration
rules; for a nuanced critique of how UNCITRAL incorporated the Transpar-
ency Rules into its arbitration rules see Samuel Levander, Resolving “Dynamic
Interpretation”: An Empirical Analysis of the Uncitral Rules on Transparency,
52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 506, 507 (2014).
122. ICC State Report, supra note 55, at 2–4.
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“can agree on greater transparency” by establishing in an arbi-
tration clause that the arbitral award or party submissions shall
be made public.123 Additionally, the report advises states “seek-
ing transparency” to include transparency requirements in
BITs. It suggests, as an example, a requirement that the tribu-
nal disclose a reasoned decision to the disputing parties.124 In
allegiance to its commercial roots and the party autonomy prin-
ciple,125 the ICC remains neutral in the debate regarding the im-
portance of transparency versus privacy and confidentiality in
international arbitration. The ICC, by explaining how to adjust
the level of transparency in its recent report on investor-state
arbitration, nevertheless, recognizes that the demand for
greater transparency in international arbitration is on the
rise.126
II. CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC INTERESTDIFFERENCE
The rationale for narrowing the scope of the Transparency
Rules, and the transparency trend in general, to investor-state
arbitration is that a “public interest difference” exists between
investor-state arbitration and international commercial arbitra-
tion.127 Part II of this Note examines flaws in the public interest
difference rationale pertaining to each of the four categories of
supposed differences between investor-state arbitration and in-
ternational commercial arbitration.
A. Democratic Deficit Concerns
An indisputable difference between international commercial
arbitration and investor-state arbitration is that, in the latter
system, only the “very presence” of a state or state-owned entity
as a party to the dispute yields a public interest. Arguably, citi-
zens of the arbitrating state have an interest in knowing how
their government conducts itself during an arbitration.128 Such
a concept invokes the democratic deficit principle.129 Since public
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 4.
125. See Charles Chatterjee, The Reality of The Party Autonomy Rule in In-
ternational Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 539, 547 (2003).
126. Id. at 2–4.
127. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 3–4.
128. Id. at 4.
129. A system creates a democratic deficit when it “curtails democratic prin-
ciples” by making issues that directly impact citizens “structurally isolated
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involvement in arbitration is the exception, rather than the
norm, and citizens of the arbitrating state are generally una-
ware of disputes,130 investor-state arbitration plainly isolates
state conduct from public input, thereby creating a democratic
deficit. To reduce such a deficit, adherents to the “public interest
difference” line of reasoning believe that remedial measures, like
the Transparency Rules, are necessary to fix the system of in-
vestor-state arbitration—a system that lacks, in their minds,
“democratic participation”131 and therefore does not fit their con-
ception of “good governance.”132
But the “democratic deficit” argument is not a legitimate basis
to advocate for transparency in investor-state arbitration, a
global system, because such an argument presupposes that non-
democratic forms of government are inherently bad govern-
ance.133 According to a recent Congressional Research Service
report, China’s Communist Party “is committed to maintaining
from public input.” Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Invest-
ment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Dem-
ocratic Deficit?, 41 VAN. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 775, 784 (2008).
130. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., Transparency and Third
Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures 2-3 (OECD
Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2005/01, 2005), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/524613550768.
131. Ctr. for Int’l Envtl. Law & Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., New
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on Transparency: Application, Content and Next
Steps 4 (2013), available at http://ccsi.colum-
bia.edu/files/2014/04/UNCITRAL_Rules_on_Transparency_commentary_FIN
AL.pdf.
132. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 5.
133. The democratic deficit argument for greater transparency in investor-
state arbitration also presupposes that covert state action is never beneficial
to the people of a democratic state. Yet, secret state actions and classified in-
formation, justifiably, have their place in even the most democratic of nations.
Both proponents and critics of the United States Freedom of Information Act
often quote a 1965 Senate report, which states that “[a] government by secrecy
benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks to serve . . . and mocks their
loyalty.” See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, When is an Invasion of Privacy Unwar-
ranted Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s “Sufficient Rea-
son” and “Presumption of Legitimacy” Standards, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
361, 368 (2005) (quoting S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965)). The same report,
nevertheless, recognizes that “[a]t the same time that a broad philosophy of
‘freedom of information’ is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain
equally important rights of privacy . . . certain material, such as the investiga-
tory files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.” S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 3
(1965).
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a permanent monopoly on power” and places a “heavy emphasis
on maintaining political stability.”134 From the Communist
Party’s perspective, good governance therefore means rejecting
the democratic separation of powers doctrine and granting all
powers ultimately to the Party’s highest ranking “committee of
seven,” without concern for creating structural isolation from
public input.135 Accordingly, under the Communist Party’s pa-
ternalistic form of government, the public interest is best served
where a democratic deficit exists. Since democratic principles
are not globally accepted, and since investor-state arbitration is
a global system, the democratic deficit argument is fundamen-
tally flawed.136 Thus, even though investor-state arbitration
raises democratic deficit concerns and international commercial
arbitration does not, such a “public interest difference” is not a
legitimate reason to increase transparency solely in the system
of investor-state arbitration.
134. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S
POLITICAL SYSTEM 1–2 (Congressional Research Service, 2013).
135. Id.
136. The contention that the presence of communist states in the global sys-
tem of international arbitration undermines the democratic deficit argument
for more transparency in investor-state arbitration is more than a theoretical
argument; it is a relevant practical matter because in July, 2013, the United
States and China reached a breakthrough in negotiations to adopt a BIT. Betsy
Bourassa, U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on the Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty Negotiations, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (July 15, 2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-Breakthrough-
Announcement-.aspx. China has been a member of the New York Convention
since 1987 and is not a newcomer to international arbitration. 1958NEWYORK
CONVENTION GUIDE, http://www.newyorkconvention1958.org (follow “China”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). The recent breakthrough marks the first
time China has been willing to negotiate a BIT that “includes all stages of in-
vestment and sectors.” Bourassa, supra. Yet, if the United States urges trans-
parency for the sake of encouraging democratic principles, instead of the more
globally amenable reason of increasing transparency to shed light on disputes
that impact public interests, such as environmental protection, negotiations
may hit added roadblocks. An environmentalist angle may be especially per-
suasive in negotiations since China is getting serious about reducing air pollu-
tion—Beijing authorities recently shut down high-polluting factories in a “mil-
itary-style operation.” Andrew Browne, Beijing Takes Aim at Smog–a Moving
Target, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2014, at A9.
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B. Public Purse and Taxpayer Concerns
The second “public interest difference” rationale used to ex-
plain why the transparency trend in international arbitration
should apply to investor-state arbitration, but not international
commercial arbitration, is that only investor-state arbitration
directly impacts the “public purse” of an arbitrating state.137
Since investor-state arbitration commonly “involves large poten-
tial monetary liability for public treasuries,” and because recent
awards have increasingly exceeded US$100 million in the past
few years, the “public’s interest is clear.”138 The citizens of the
arbitrating state arguably have a right to see their tax dollars at
work and a right to know about arbitrations that impact state
finances. In contrast, public funds are not directly at stake in
international commercial arbitration; commentators therefore
conclude that greater transparency is only necessary in investor-
state arbitration.139
Yet, numerous nations around the globe “have a long-standing
policy of subsidizing the energy sector” to keep energy rates at
an affordable level for the majority of their citizens.140 Both de-
veloping and developed nations have such policies in amounts
that far exceed the amounts that have been at stake in investor-
state arbitration.141 Therefore, even though the fate of a subsi-
dized entity in international commercial arbitration only indi-
rectly impacts the “public purse,” if the transparency trend is
intended to let the public see their tax dollars at work, interna-
tional commercial arbitration should be transparent, especially
when comparing the award amounts in investor-state arbitra-
tion to the enormity of energy sector subsidy programs alone.142
137. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 5.
138. Id. at 4.
139. Id.
140. Felix Mormann,Requirements for A Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 903, 932 (2011).
141. For example, government spending in Argentina on energy subsidies
rose by nearly 72 percent in the first three quarters of 2013 to ARS$60 billion
(US$8.86 billion). Ken Parks, Argentina Threatens to Revoke Utility Conces-
sions Amid Power Outage, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2013. Similarly, in the United
States, oil industry tax breaks alone average about US$4 billion annually. Da-
vid Kocieniewski, As Oil Industry Fights a Tax, it Reaps Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2010, at A9.
142. When a highly subsidized corporation loses in arbitration, the damages
it pays out may be perceived as coming directly out of the profits of the corpo-
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Thus, the “public purse” and taxpayer concern argument is not
a sufficient basis to justify limiting the transparency trend to
investor-State arbitration.
C. Allegations of Government Misconduct
The third “public interest difference” used to explain why
greater transparency is required in investor-state arbitration,
but not international commercial arbitration, is that opening up
the former system to public scrutiny will expose government
misconduct and therefore allegedly protect public interests.143
Indeed, whether government misconduct occurred is a common
issue in investor-state arbitral disputes.144 Paradoxically, how-
ever, in the context of investor-state arbitration, exposing gov-
ernment misconduct actually serves the private interests of the
investor rather than the public interests of the citizens of the
arbitrating state. Although proponents of the “public interest
difference” advocate for greater transparency in the name of pro-
tecting public interests, they are more concerned with protecting
the private interests of investors—at least when it comes to ex-
posing government misconduct.145 The veiled intent of such ad-
vocates becomes clear upon realizing that a primary function of
BITs, and the investor-state arbitration regimes established
therein, is to protect foreign investors from the nationalization
or expropriation of their property by state actors.146 Expropria-
tion is a serious risk to foreign direct investments.147 Although
certain aspects of BITs vary from state to state, recent BITs gen-
erally mandate that a state must compensate private investors
ration’s immediate shareholders; less profit, however, means fewer invest-
ments, less future profit, and consequently the need for more subsidies. Thus,
the public is a key stakeholder in subsidized private parties.
143. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 4.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 4–5.
146. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do Bits Really Work?:
An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46
HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 87 (2005).
147. Between 1960 and 1974, the U.N. identified 875 independent instances
of governmental taking of foreign property in sixty-two countries. See Don C.
Piper, New Directions in the Protection of American-Owned Property Abroad, 4
MD. J. INT’LL.&TRADE. 315, 330 (1979). See generallyU.N. Conf. on Trade and
Dev., EXPROPRIATION: A SEQUEL, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.7. (2012) (examining
recent investment treaty practices regarding expropriation).
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if it expropriates property.148 Since exposing government mis-
conduct in investor-state arbitration really protects the private
interests of investors, it is not a legitimate “public interest dif-
ference” that justifies increasing transparency in investor-state
arbitration but not international commercial arbitration.
D. Issues of Public Policy
The final “public interest difference” rationale put forth to de-
fend increasing transparency solely in investor-state arbitra-
tion, and not in international commercial arbitration, is that in-
vestor-state arbitral disputes often raise “profoundly important
issues of public policy”—such as environmental protection, pub-
lic safety and health, and market competition—and therefore
the public has a right to know about such disputes.149 Advocates
of this view further argue that governmental decision making
and conduct that impacts public policies (i.e., investor-state ar-
bitral disputes concerning drinking water supplies, hazardous
waste, fishing permits, racial discrimination, and responses to
fiscal crises) should be transparent.150
Proponents of the “public interest difference” oddly appear un-
perturbed by the fact that hazardous waste is dangerous, and
thus of public concern, regardless of whether it is at issue in an
arbitration between private parties or, instead, between a pri-
vate investor and a state or state-owned entity. The seminal re-
port on this topic, by The Center for International Environmen-
tal Law (“CIEL”), seems especially contradictory. CIEL’s mis-
sion is “to protect the environment, promote human health, and
ensure a just and sustainable society.”151 Such a mission is quite
limited, and easily compromised, if the organization is only con-
cerned about protecting the environment from state actors and
not from private polluters as well.152 CIEL’s 2007 report, which
148. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, supra note 144, at 89.
149. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 5.
150. Id.
151. Who We Are, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L., http://www.ciel.org/About_Us/in-
dex.html.
152. B.P., P.L.C., for instance, is a private polluter that caused billions of
dollars’ worth of environmental damages in relation to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster; to truly promote its mission, CIEL certainly must be concerned about
protecting the environment from such private polluters, in addition to guard-
ing the environment from state actors that pollute or otherwise jeopardize the
environment and human health. See Tom Fowler, BP Slapped with Record
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advocates for limiting the scope of the then nascent Transpar-
ency Rules to investor-state arbitration, describes how it is “of-
ten impossible” for the public to learn about investor-state arbi-
trations—even disputes that impact basic human needs like san-
itary drinking water.153 The report also states that, in theory, a
party may voluntarily choose to publicize information regarding
a dispute that impacts the environment because parties are not
bound, under the default arbitration rules of UNCITRAL, by a
duty of confidentiality.154 In practice, however, voluntary disclo-
sure “rarely happens.”155 Such facets of investor-state arbitra-
tion apply equally to international commercial arbitration, but
the report parrots the “widely acknowledged” fact that there is a
“public interest difference” between the two systems of arbitra-
tion.156 The report limits its recommendation for greater trans-
parency to investor-state arbitration, expressly excluding inter-
national commercial arbitration, since private commercial dis-
putes “do not necessarily concern the public interest.”157
Yet the report omits any refutation of the principle that com-
mercial disputes may also impact the “profoundly important is-
sues of public policy” discussed in the report.158 Although com-
mercial disputes do not necessarily impact public policy issues,
the elephant in the room is that, if the subject matter of a dispute
involves anticompetitive behavior, hazardous waste, or a toxic
chemical leaking into sources of drinking water, public interests
are no less impacted because the disputants are private par-
ties.159 Public notice of such disputes would allow states to adopt
Fine—Oil Giant to Pay $4.5 Billion, Plead Guilty to Criminal Charges in 2010
Gulf Spill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2012.
153. CIEL Report 2007, supra note 16, at 5.
154. Id. For more information on confidentiality and the lack thereof under
the default arbitration rules of the ICC see discussion supra Part I.A.2.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 4.
159. For example, a privately held international commercial arbitration hy-
pothetically could have occurred prior to the Elk River chemical spill in West
Virginia. Thus, if international commercial arbitration was not capable of be-
ing absolutely private, regulators may have become aware of a past arbitral
dispute in which Freedom Industries Inc., the owner of the chemical storage
facility, took part, related to the retrofitting of its storage tanks—which it
never retrofitted. Then, regulators could have taken preemptive action to pre-
vent the spill, instead of starting probes presently into how a leaky storage
tank that dates back to 1938 was still in use and spilled 7,500 gallons of a toxic
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rules and regulations that address the actual problems faced by
commercial parties, ideally before public disasters occur.160
Thus, when it comes to profoundly important issues of public
policy, there is no genuine “public interest difference” between
investor-state arbitration and international commercial arbitra-
tion.
E. The Public Interest Difference is Bunk
Even if the first three rationales for limiting the transparency
trend to investor-state arbitration—democratic deficit concerns,
public purse concerns, and allegations of government miscon-
duct—are accepted at face value, the “public interest difference”
is not a sufficient basis to exclude international commercial ar-
bitration from the transparency trend, because commercial dis-
putes can, and do, impact profoundly important issues of public
policy, such as environmental protection, public safety and
health, and market competition. Since the Supreme Court of the
United States decided Mitsubishi Motors in 1985,161 even anti-
trust claims, which impact the important public policy of market
competition, have been at stake around the world in interna-
tional commercial arbitration.162
chemical into the Elk River, polluting drinking water for days. SeeValerie Bau-
erlein & Cameron McWhirter, Leaky Tank’s Design, Age Probed, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 2014.
160. See Id.
161. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
162. The impact ofMitsubishi Motors is not limited to the United States, be-
cause, unlike in the United States, the high courts of other nations are not
hesitant to examine the decisions of other nations as persuasive authority. Ad-
ditionally, the New York Convention incorporates principles of reciprocity,
and, therefore, how one nation interprets the Convention may influence how
others interpret it. The “reciprocity reservation” in Article I of the New York
Convention permits states to apply the Convention on a reciprocal basis, which
means the courts of states that adopt the reservation need only enforce awards
made in states that are also members of the Convention. Joseph T. McLaughlin
& Laurie Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under the New York Con-
vention - Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 249, 252 (1986). At
least forty-three states have adopted the reciprocity reservation. Id. Although
this Note focuses on U.S. jurisprudence, other states, such as France, have
adopted similar judicial policies in favor of arbitration. See generally Carbon-
neau, supra note 81, at 1347 (describing post–New York Convention develop-
ments in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States).
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III. MITSUBISHIMOTORS AND BLIND SPOT JUSTICE
In its landmarkMitsubishi Motors decision, the United States
Supreme Court mistakenly opened the floodgates for disputants
to use international commercial arbitration to privately resolve
disputes that impact profoundly important issues of public pol-
icy, such as the protection of market competition.163 In
Mitsubishi, the Court reversed the First Circuit’s ruling on an
antitrust claim, a ruling which had followed the Second Circuit’s
American Safety doctrine; ultimately, the Court held that anti-
trust claims under the Sherman Act are arbitrable subject mat-
ter in the context of international commercial arbitration.164 Un-
til Mitsubishi, the American Safety doctrine was good law; it
held that antitrust claims were nonarbitrable because “the per-
vasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and
the nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to
make . . . antitrust claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration.”165
Although antitrust actions that are raised or investigated by
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) draw most of the media at-
tention,166 the Sherman Act allows any person injured by a “re-
straint of trade or commerce” to bring suit under the Act, and
awards prevailing claimants treble damages.167 When a contrac-
tual dispute arises, therefore, private commercial parties may
raise antitrust matters as collateral claims or counterclaims to
the initial breach of contract claim.Mitsubishi is a prime exam-
ple of such a scenario.
163. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
164. Id. at 628–40.
165. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
166. See e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Secretive Apple Squirms in Gaze of U.S.
Monitor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, at A1 (chronicling developments in Apple’s
feud with a court appointed monitor, Michael Bromwich, and the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Department of Justice regarding the company’s duties to cooper-
ate with further investigations into the e-book price-fixing conspiracy that it
was found guilty of entering in the summer of 2013).
167. Under the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2012). Furthermore, “any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . .
. and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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Justice Stevens’ dissent succinctly describes the factual back-
ground relevant to the antitrust claim in Mitsubishi.168 Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., an American automobile dealer,
claimed that two major automobile manufacturers, including
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., were part of an “international cartel”
restraining competition in the American marketplace in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.169 Based upon an arbitration clause in
Chrysler’s franchise agreement with the manufacturers, and af-
ter deciding that antitrust claims are arbitrable subject matter,
the Court ultimately compelled the parties to arbitrate all of
their claims in Japan, the place of arbitration named in the fran-
chise agreement.170 Notably, this is an instance where the par-
ties ended up in court prior to arbitration because the first reac-
tion of the manufacturers, who claimed Chrysler breached the
franchise agreement, was to go to district court seeking an order
to compel arbitration of the claim171—presumably since the man-
ufacturers anticipated that Chrysler would be reluctant to arbi-
trate in Japan without a court battle.172
168. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
640 (Stevens, J., dissent) (1985).
169. Id.
170. The arbitration clause of the franchise agreement provided as follows:
All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V
of this Agreement or for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by
arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 617.
171. The manufacturers invoked Section 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA,”) which reads “[a] court having jurisdiction under this chapter may di-
rect that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place
therein provided for, whether that place is within or without the United
States.” See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 206 (1970).
172. This Note focuses on public notice via the potentiality of an enforcement
proceeding after arbitration has privately occurred. The public is notified of
disputes prior to arbitration, in instances like Mitsubishi, because the parties
dispute whether their arbitration agreement is valid or argue that the subject
matter of a claim is nonarbitrable. Yet, post-Mitsubishi, the latter occurrence
is almost nonexistent becauseMitsubishi effectively holds that all subject mat-
ter is arbitrable, even statutory claims that impact important public policy in-
terests like market competition. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
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A. The Misguided Rationale of Mitsubishi Motors
In Mitsubishi, the pro-enforcement bias of the New York Con-
vention heavily influenced the ratio decidendi of the Court.173
Revisiting the decision demonstrates that the Court discounted
public interest concerns under the misguided presumption that
the “award-enforcement stage”174 would provide an opportunity
to protect public interests by allowing courts to minimally re-
view outcomes and at least determine whether tribunals “took
cognizance [of], . . . and actually decided,” claims that raise is-
sues of public policy.175 The Court also expected enforcement pro-
ceedings to serve the “policing function” of the Sherman Act.176
But hindsight reveals that enforcement proceedings have be-
come the exception rather than the norm in international com-
mercial arbitration because most arbitrations end in settlement
or voluntary award compliance.177 Thus, the policing function of
the Sherman Act has been compromised.178 Public notice via en-
forcement proceedings in court of disputes otherwise arbitrated
in private, which the Court envisioned as a sufficient procedural
safeguard to protect public interests, rarely occurs. The current
system of international commercial arbitration therefore know-
ingly permits commercial disputes that impact profoundly im-
portant issues of public policy, such as the protection of market
competition, to be resolved in absolute privacy.179 Such willful
ignorance is blind spot justice.
173. The pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention is shown clearly
by the presumption in Article II of the Convention that “[e]ach Contracting
State shall recognize” written agreements to arbitrate that “concern[] a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 2, June 10, 1958, 330 U.S.T.S
3. Prior toMitsubishi, the Court had declared that the FAA, which essentially
codifies the Convention, “create[d] a body of federal substantive law establish-
ing and regulating the duty [of courts] to honor an agreement to arbitrate” and
represents a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation, 460 U.S. 1,
24$25 (1983). Thus, the Court begins with a strong bias in favor of enforce-
ment.
174. 473 U.S. at 638.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 635.
177. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
178. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 635.
179. See id. at 638.
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The Court framed the issue of whether antitrust claims are
arbitrable as a balancing of the public interest concerns of the
American Safety doctrine against the “strong belief” in the effec-
tiveness of arbitration for resolving international commercial
disputes, as established by Scherk,180 and a “commitment to the
enforcement of freely negotiated choice of forum clauses.”181
Then, the Court proceeded to dismantle the latter three of the
four “ingredients” of the American Safety doctrine, finding, es-
sentially, that the doctrine underestimated the capabilities of an
arbitral tribunal to hear complex cases, to be “conscientious,”
and to be neutral.182 Next, the court recognized that the first in-
gredient of the American Safety doctrine still remained, stating:
“[w]e are left, then, with the core of the American Safety doc-
trine—the fundamental importance to American democratic
capitalism of the regime of the antitrust laws.”183 In other words,
“private parties play a pivotal role in aiding governmental en-
forcement of the antitrust laws by means of the private action
for treble damages.”184 This is the policing function of the Sher-
man Act. Private actions help enforce the Act and bring to light
antitrust violations that would otherwise go undetected by gov-
ernment authorities, which in turn serves the public interest in
protecting market competition.185
180. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974) (holding that Se-
curities Exchange Act claims arising out of or related to an international con-
tract are arbitrable because specifying the forum for potential disputes is “an
almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and pre-
dictability essential to any international business transaction” and a “paro-
chial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration
agreement” would undermine such an achievement).
181. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 631. See generallyM/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (rejecting the traditional “parochial” view of pre-
dispute forum selection clauses as “ousting” the jurisdiction of the court and
holding such clauses enforceable because of the following reasons: (1) modern
businesses operate in “world markets,” (2) it is an “era when all courts are
overloaded,” and (3) the courts of the United States cannot operate in world
markets “exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our
courts.”).
182. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632–33.
183. Id. at 634.
184. Id. at 632.
185. Although there is a sticky similarity here to democratic deficit concerns,
which this Note deems an illegitimate basis from which to argue for greater
transparency in investor-state arbitration, see supra Part II, there is a compre-
hensive distinction. Although capitalism is closely associated with democracy,
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Yet the Court failed to recognize the downstream effects of al-
lowing antitrust claims to be resolved in the private—and some-
times fully confidential—system of international commercial ar-
bitration. Although antitrust actions raised by private parties in
arbitration might still aid the government by stopping specific
instances of collusion, broadened arbitrability has blinded the
government, courts, and regulators alike, to the existence of, and
information about, such actions. Despite the pivotal role that
private party claims play in policing world markets for antitrust
violations, the Court swept such concerns under the rug. In one
sentence, the Court shifts the discussion of private party claims
from the importance of protecting market competition, to its fi-
nal determination that the primary purpose of private antitrust
claims is to compensate the injured party.186
Notwithstanding its important incidental policing function, the
treble-damages cause of action conferred on private parties, . .
. and pursued by [Chrysler] here by way of its third counter-
claim, seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain
compensation for that injury.187
The Court utilizes the oxymoron “important incidental” to
sweep aside the policing function of private party antitrust
claims. Once the Court narrows the issue of whether private
party antitrust claims should be arbitrable to hinge on whether
arbitration provides an “adequate mechanism” for the private
party to “seek his antitrust recovery,” the issue skews in favor of
arbitrability.188 The Court willingly swept aside the policing
function of the Sherman Act because the majority of the Court
mistakenly presumed that when future antitrust disputes would
it is an economic construct and not a political one. Even though states like
China do not embrace democratic political principles, when such states engage
in world markets and international commercial arbitration, they are embrac-
ing the economic principles of market capitalism. Politics aside, market com-
petition is considered publicly beneficial, and thus protecting it serves public
policy interests because competition results in lower prices. If antitrust laws
are not enforced, then businesses may collude, or merge to form a monopoly
over an industry, and charge higher prices. For an in-depth study of Chinese
state capitalism, see generally, Li-Wen Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt,We Are the
(National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in
China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013).
186. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 635.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 636.
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be decided in arbitration, courts would “have the opportunity at
the award-enforcement stage” to ensure that the tribunal at
least applied the antitrust law of the state where enforcement is
sought.189
Additionally, the Court assumed that a tribunal adjudicating
enforcement proceedings, upon finding a violation of antitrust
law, would be able to refuse enforcement of an award as contrary
to public policy, under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Conven-
tion.190 Although this theory may have been sound at the time,
in hindsight the Court was wrong for two reasons. First, the vast
majority of international commercial arbitrations end in settle-
ment or voluntary award compliance; thus, the enforcement
stage is never reached.191 Second, even if the enforcement stage
is reached, scholarship and court precedent strongly suggest
that the Article V(2)(b) public policy defense may only be invoked
if enforcement is “obnoxious” to “internationally accepted stand-
ards.”192 In other words, enforcement must be against interna-
tional public policy.193 Fraud is the best example of an act that
is sufficiently condemnable under international standards, but
anticompetitive behavior is considered improper only under the
laws of some countries.194Courts often balk when asked to refuse
enforcement of an award on the grounds that enforcement would
only be contrary to national public policy—such grounds reek of
the “parochialism” the New York Convention is intended to
stop.195 Consequently, sophisticated commercial parties are
more likely to voluntarily comply with arbitral awards of dam-
ages for antitrust violations because they are well aware that
courts generally hold that the public policy exception is not a
valid defense to the enforcement of such awards.
B. The Global Impact of Mitsubishi Motors
In the current post-Mitsubishi era of broadened subject-matter
arbitrability, as claims impacting public policy interests funnel
away from public court litigation to privately conducted interna-
189. Id. at 638.
190. Id. at 638–39.
191. See supra, Part II, at 7.
192. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 109.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. SeeM/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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tional commercial arbitration, history lends merit to the conten-
tion in Justice Stevens’ Mitsubishi dissent—that an arbitration
clause should not be construed to cover statutory claims and
remedies that it does not “expressly identify.”196 Justice Stevens
also found that Congress did not intend for the FAA to apply to
antitrust claims and, moreover, that Congress did not intend for
the New York Convention to apply to disputes not covered by the
FAA.197 Thus, the Court should have adhered to the American
Safety doctrine that “the pervasive public interest in enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws” makes antitrust claims nonarbitra-
ble.198 Hindsight reveals that such an affirmation would have
better served public policy interests, while also providing greater
protection for the physical and financial safety of individual
Americans and world markets.
The majority decision in Mitsubishi instead opened the flood-
gates for subject matter concerning important public interests to
be arbitrable, without consideration for the consequences of al-
lowing such claims to be arbitrated in private. The privacy of
arbitration undermines the policing function of statutes like the
Sherman Act because the government and the public cannot see
disputes that impact public interests, such as market competi-
tion, unless enforcement proceedings occur. Yet such proceed-
ings have become the exception, not the norm.199
The impact of Mitsubishi is global. In a sanitized final award
from 2010, Case No. 14046, unofficially published by the Inter-
national Council for Commercial Arbitration (“ICCA”),200 that
196. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 641. Still, this suggestion is likely unworkable
because it would require parties to negotiate an exhaustive list to include in
their arbitration clause of what statutory claims they want to be arbitrable.
Conversely, if the parties left such a list out of their contract, then there would
likely be an inefficient rise in parallel litigation and arbitration—parties would
be bound to arbitrate their breach of contract claims and forced to litigate all
of their collateral statutory claims.
197. Id. at 641.
198. Id. at 629 (quoting American Safety).
199. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
200. Case No. 14046 of 2010, 35 Y.B. Com. Arb. 241 (ICC Int’l Ct. Arb.) [here-
inafter Case No. 14046]. The ICCA is a global NGO governed by a board of
dispute resolution specialists. The organization is “devoted to promoting the
use and improving the processes of arbitration” and “its activities include con-
vening . . . congresses and conferences, sponsoring . . . publications, and pro-
moting the harmonization of arbitration and conciliation rules, laws, proce-
dures and standards.” ICCA, About the International Council for Commercial
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concerns a dispute between Italian parties arbitrated in Swit-
zerland, the tribunal cites Mitsubishi as a “decisive turning
point.”201 The tribunal describes how the Supreme Court of Swit-
zerland, in light of Mitsubishi, “no longer questions whether is-
sues of anti-trust laws are arbitrable,” and thus holds under
Swiss law that it has the authority to decide matters of EU and
Italian competition law.202 The dispute concerned a non-compete
clause that restricted the “business activities” of Respondents 1
and 2 for five years; the tribunal ultimately reduced the clause
to two years.203 More importantly, the tribunal found that Ital-
ian competition law applied, even though the penalties owed for
the antitrust violations “fell below the threshold for mandatory
communication to the Italian anti-trust authority.”204 Although
minor violations are not required to be disclosed to the govern-
ment, Italy has, at least partially, solved the problem of blind
spot justice in the context of competition law, while the United
States has utterly failed.205
Under the United States Clayton Act, companies considering
a merger or acquisition above a certain threshold “must notify
both the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion.”206 The Sherman Act, however, lacks similar reporting re-
quirements.207 Thus, if a party raises an antitrust claim, such as
alleging that its adversary is part of a vast price-fixing scheme,
Arbitration, ARBITRATION-ICCA.ORG, http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/about.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
201. Case No. 14046, supra note 197, at 250.
202. See id. at 250-51. Since the place of arbitration was Switzerland, Swiss
law governed the jurisdictional and procedural aspects of the arbitration, in-
cluding what subject-matter was arbitrable—unless the parties had specified
otherwise. The choice of law provision in the contract of the parties determines
what substantive law the tribunal is to apply, once the tribunal determines
that it has jurisdiction over the claim. Here, the choice of law was EU and
Italian law. Thus, Swiss law determined the procedural issue of whether the
tribunal could decide antitrust issues, but the tribunal applied EU and Italian
competition law to decide the substantive antitrust issue. Id. at 245–47, 250–
51.
203. Id. at 259.
204. Id. at 241.
205. Id.
206. Antitrust Laws and You, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/about/antitrust-laws.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
207. Id.
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within the private and sometimes confidential context of inter-
national commercial arbitration,208 then the tribunal might ren-
der an award that compensates the claimant for its injury and
award treble damages; nevertheless, there is no public disclo-
sure mechanism in place to alert authorities to the anti-compet-
itive acts that are the basis for such an award.209
Case No. 14046 therefore suggests the solution to the problem
of blind spot justice. In the context of U.S. antitrust law, Con-
gress must amend the Sherman Act to require private party
claimants, or courts, to report findings of antitrust violations to
the DOJ. Where U.S. law is the substantive law that governs an
international commercial arbitration, such an amendment
would effectively compel the claimant, or tribunal, as required
by applicable law,210 to report the award to the DOJ. Since arbi-
tral tribunals are already finding facts and determining the le-
gal merits of such claims, a reporting requirement is an efficient
solution. Increasing arbitral transparency by requiring the pub-
lication of unsanitized awards will simultaneously reinvigorate
the policing function of the Sherman Act and serve the public
interest in protecting market competition.211 Requiring the pub-
lication of arbitral awards that contain findings of antitrust vio-
lations provides a microcosmic solution to end blind spot justice.
CONCLUSION
In light of the refutation of the “public interest difference,”212
which proves to be illegitimate, at worst, and insufficient, at
208. See discussion supra Part I.A.II.
209. The lack of a disclosure mechanism may explain why it has taken over
ten years for the FBI and DOJ to close in on Mitsubishi Electric Corporation
and its fellow colluders in their latest price-fixing scandal. This current price-
fixing scandal also illustrates that nearly thirty years after Mitsubishi, the
Mitsubishi conglomerate is not deterred by existing antitrust law. Mitsubishi’s
recidivism also suggests that, had Mitsubishi not broadened the blind spot in
international commercial arbitration to include private claims under the Sher-
man Act, it is likely that—considering the litigious nature of the auto indus-
try—privately conducted arbitrations regarding such claims would have in-
stead been in public courtrooms. See Ayapana, supra note 27, at 20; Ashby
Jones, Plaintiff Lawyers Take Aim at GM, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2014, at A1.
210. Even the ICC’s model confidential arbitration clause contemplates dis-
closures that are required by law. See ICC State Report, supra note 55, at 3.
211. See discussion supra Part III.B.
212. See discussion supra Part II.
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best, as a basis to restrict the transparency trend in interna-
tional arbitration to investor-state arbitration, and the lesson of
Mitsubishi,213 which reveals how broadened subject matter arbi-
trability, the privacy of arbitration, and the rarity of enforce-
ment proceedings all unite to imperil the public interests at
stake in international commercial arbitration, responsible or-
ganizations like UNCITRAL must end blind spot justice.
“Blind spot justice” describes the phenomenon that the current
system of international commercial arbitration permits, wherein
private parties resolve disputes that impact profoundly im-
portant issues of public policy, such as environmental protection,
public health and safety, and market competition, without any
public notice. Due to the pro-enforcement bias and success of the
New York Convention,214 blind spot justice currently thrives.
Since the presumption under the convention is that awards shall
be enforced by the courts of member states, defenses to enforce-
ment are limited to the procedural fairness grounds of Article
V(1) and the narrowly construed public policy defense of Article
V(2)(b), and, since Mitsubishi has hollowed out the nonarbitra-
ble subject matter defense of Article V(2)(a), the party that loses
in arbitration has little expectation of subsequently “winning”215
in a court enforcement proceeding. As a result, and as verified
by statistics,216 generally the losing party’s best choice is volun-
tary award compliance, which avoids the monetary costs of liti-
gation and the reputational costs of public disclosure of the dis-
pute.217 Such compliance signals that the system is working be-
cause arbitral awards are meant to be final and binding.218 But
the system is final and binding only because courts around the
globe stand behind it—like a backstop. International commer-
cial arbitration is therefore innately tied to the public court sys-
tem. Even in cases where voluntary award compliance occurs,
the decision of the tribunal becomes final and binding due to the
implied enforcement power of the public court system. Since the
213. See discussion supra Part III.
214. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
215. From the perspective of the party challenging an award in enforcement
proceedings, “winning”means an outcome where a court refuses to enforce the
award or a court in the place of arbitration sets it aside. See GARNETT ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 107.
216. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
217. See discussion supra Part I.A.
218. See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 5, at 20.
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system of international commercial arbitration exploits the en-
forcement power of the public court system, even where volun-
tary award compliance occurs, the public has a right, at the very
least, to notice of arbitral disputes in which the tribunal issues
a final award.219 But, the current system of international com-
mercial arbitration permits private disputes that impact pro-
foundly important public policy interests to be arbitrated in ab-
solute privacy and, sometimes, confidentiality. Such blind spot
justice must end.
Before the conception that greater transparency is required
only in the system of investor-state arbitration takes root via the
promulgation of the Transparency Rules, UNCITRAL must
broaden the transparency trend in international arbitration by
promulgating a companion rule for international commercial ar-
bitration that requires the publication of unsanitized arbitral
awards.
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